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I. INTRODUCTION 
November 8, 2018, started as any other morning would in the small Northern 
California town of Paradise.1 However, in the early morning, a live wire broke 
free of its grip causing a single customer power failure.2 A fire then broke out 
near the broken wire.3 Rich Ellison, a resident of Paradise during the fire, 
explained how people “got out with the clothes on their back and their 
prescription meds and their slippers.”4 He further described the panic: “There 
were people trapped in their cars that died and people that got out and ran 
because it was a gridlock.”5 Fire engulfed the entire town within hours and 
eventually killed eighty-five people, causing nearly seven billion dollars in 
damage.6 
California experienced some of its deadliest wildfires ever in 2017 and 
2018.7 While Governor Newsom and the Legislature focus on the recovery of 
companies like Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”), the people of Paradise remain 
in flux.8 “They feel like they don’t have a voice and there’s no one watching out 
for them.”9 For the people of Paradise, recovery means rebuilding and moving 
forward in any way possible.10 
Chapter 79 is the most recent legislative response to wildfire-caused 
destruction.11 The law aims to protect Californians by establishing tougher and 
more extensive guidelines for the electrical companies associated with these 
 
1.  Ivan Penn, Peter Eavis & James Glanz, How PG&E Ignored Fire Risks in Favor of Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/18/business/pge-california-wildfires.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Telephone Interview with Rich Ellison, a Paradise resident (June 24, 2019) (notes on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
5.  Id. 
6.  Penn, Eavis & Glanz, supra note 1; Andrew Sheeler, These Three 2018 California Wildfires Caused 
More Than $9 Billion in Damage, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 12, 2018),  
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article222997430.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).  
7.  Sheeler, supra note 6. 
8.  Taryn Luna, To Reduce Wildfires and Save Utilities, Newsom Wants $10.5 billion From Ratepayers, 
L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-wildfire-utility-fund-
20190621-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Telephone Interview with Rich 
Ellison, supra note 4.  
9.  Telephone Interview with Rich Ellison, supra note 4. 
10.  Id. 
11.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79) (establishing greater regulatory framework to 
protect ratepayers and force investor-owned utilities to enact greater safety precautions in order to access help 
from the government to pay off wildfire liabilities).  
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fires.12 It is part of a statewide, multi–year effort to combat the wildfires’ 
devastating impacts and to protect the state’s electrical infrastructure.13 This law 
is a crucial step forward, yet it pushes pause by providing utilities a quick 
financial fix in exchange for future promises of reform.14 Placing a band-aid on 
the problem can only go so far.15 Chapter 79 sounds great in theory but 
Californians need real solutions now, and not theoretical ones in the future.16 
Real solutions for Californians would take a look at the cause of wildfires in 
order to prevent them from happening in the first place.17 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Former Governor Jerry Brown commented that although “Californians 
depend on reliable electrical power . . . costly wildfires . . . undermine this 
system, leaving our energy sector in a state of weakness at a time when it should 
be making even greater investments in safety.”18 California has a long history of 
regulatory reform to protect and enhance this vital system.19 Section A explores 
the regulatory agencies in charge of the energy markets.20 Section B explains the 
basis for liability for investor-owned utilities.21 Section C looks into previous 
wildfire-related litigation and how it impacted Chapter 79.22 
A. Energy Regulatory Agencies 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is an independent 
federal regulatory agency in charge of regulating utility corporations.23 The 
FERC oversees interstate transmission and the wholesale sale of energy in the 
electric, gas, and oil industries.24 It also monitors the interstate energy systems 
and oversees larger environmental concerns related to the natural gas and 
 
12.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79). 
13.  GOVERNOR NEWSOM, CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRES, CLIMATE CHANGES AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE, 2 
(2019). 
14.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79). 
15.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see infra Part IV. 
16.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see infra Part IV. 
17.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see infra Part IV. 
18.  Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, to Bill Dodd, Co-Chair of the Conference 
Committee on Wildfire Preparedness and Response, and Chis Holden, Co-Chair of the Conference Committee 
on Wildfire Preparedness and Response (July 24, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
19.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess., 4 (Cal. 2019) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
20.  See infra Part II.A.  
21.  See infra Part II.B. 
22.  See infra Part II.C.  
23. What FERC Does, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (last updated Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).   
24.  Id. 
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electricity industry.25 
At the state level, public utility commissions regulate utility operations.26 The 
California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) regulates California investor-
owned electric and natural gas utilities operating within the state.27 It sets the 
prices and revenue standards for electrical utility companies.28 
The CPUC’s main function is to determine the amount each utility can 
collect from its customers.29 The charge includes the utility’s revenue 
requirement, maintenance and operating costs, and power procurement.30 If an 
electrical utility intends to increase its rates, the CPUC decides whether the 
electrical utility can do so.31 
B. Liability for Investor-Owned Utilities 
Inverse condemnation is a legal doctrine that holds investor-owned utility 
companies liable for the damage their equipment causes.32 This legal concept 
entitles property owners to compensation if their property sustains damage in the 
course of public use.33 Inverse condemnation is one avenue for utilities to pay 
damages to victims because of their equipment.34 
Inverse condemnation usually applies exclusively to government agencies 
that damage private property while providing public services.35 The doctrine is 
common, but the way California applies it is not.36 California grants investor-
owned utility companies the power to condemn private property using eminent 
domain to construct infrastructure and operate their businesses.37 While investor-
owned electrical corporations are private corporations, they act as public entities 
 
25.  Id. 
26.  Utility Regulation and Policy, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY, 
https://aceee.org/topics/utility-regulation-and-policy (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
27.  Electric Costs, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMM’N (last updated 2019), 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Costs_Rates/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
28.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 4. 
29.  Electric Costs, supra note 27. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Inverse Condemnation Fact Sheet, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES AND CALIFORNIA STATE ASS’N 
OF COUNTIES (last accessed Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/inverse_condemnation_fact_sheet_league__csac.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  David R. Baker, The California Rule That Doomed PG&E: Inverse Condemnation, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 15, 2019, 4:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/the-california-rule-that-
doomed-pg-e-inverse-condemnation (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Inverse Condemnation and Utility Liability, CALIFORNIA STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES (last accessed 
Oct. 13, 2019), http://www.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/csac_issue_brief_inverse_condemnation_7-25-18.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
413 
due to the nature of their services.38 Therefore, investor-owned electrical utilities 
in California are strictly liable when the utility’s infrastructure causes the ignition 
and the resulting damage.39 
Caselaw in California established liability for investor-owned utility 
companies under inverse condemnation.40 In Holtz v. Superior Court, the court 
explained the reasoning for socializing these costs.41 The costs associated with 
activities that generate public benefits should be “distribute[d] throughout the 
community . . . to socialize the burden . . . that should be assumed by society.”42 
Investor-owned utilities can socialize these costs through raising rates and 
spreading costs on customers who benefit from the service.43 Because of this 
doctrine, victims can recover their damages from these electrical corporations in 
exchange for a dominant presence in California.44 
C. Previous Wildfire Legislation 
Chapter 79 is not the first law that California enacted to further regulate 
electrical utilities.45 The 2001–2002 legislative session adopted AB 57 following 
the 2000–2001 energy crisis.46 AB 57 provided guidance to electrical 
corporations by requiring the CPUC review procurement plans of electrical 
corporations.47 It came about to restore investor confidence after the energy 
crisis.48 The procurement plans provided reliable and achievable standards to 
 
38.  Id. 
39.  CAROLYN KOUSKY, KATHERINE GREIG & BRETT LINGLE, FINANCING THIRD PARTY WILDFIRE 
DAMAGES: OPTIONS FOR CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES, WHARTON RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESS 
CTR. (2019).  
40.  See Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 599 (1979) 
(finding that investor-owned utilities are more like government entities than private employers based on 
regulation by the CPUC); see also Barham v. Southern California Edison Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424 (App. Div. 
1999) (finding that investor-owned utilities are liable for damages caused from wildfires started by their 
equipment under the doctrine of inverse condemnation because of the utility’s ability to condemn property 
through eminent domain).  
41.  See Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d. 296, 303 (1970) (finding that plaintiffs should receive 
compensation under Article I, Section 14 of the California Constitution for “any actual physical injury to real 
property proximately caused by the improvement as deliberately designed and constructed” in accordance with 
the principles of inverse condemnation).   
42.  Holtz, 3 Cal. 3d at 303.  
43.  KOUSKY, GREIG & LINGLE, supra note 39. 
44.  Id.  
45.  Southern California Edison Company, Comments on Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement 
Public Utilities Code Section 451.2 Regarding Criteria and Methodology for Wildfire Cost Recovery Pursuant 
to Senate Bill 901, at 3 (Feb. 11, 2019), 
http://www3.sce.com/sscc/law/dis/dbattach5e.nsf/0/43A6A8DBE6435F278825839F0002C51A/$FILE/R19010
06-SCE%20Opening%20Comments%20on%20OIR.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review).  
46.  Id. at 11, 12. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id.  
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ensure stabilization in the state’s energy market to restore investors’ 
confidence.49 
After the devastating 2017 and 2018 wildfires, the Legislature passed SB 
901.50 Discussing the importance of the bill, then-Governor Brown explained, 
“[w]ildfires in California aren’t going away, and we have to do everything 
possible to prevent them.”51 Lawmakers hoped this bill would “prevent 
catastrophic wildfires and protect Californians.”52 Senator Bill Dodd called it “a 
comprehensive approach” to protect both victims of the devastation and utility 
ratepayers.53 
SB 901 requires that electric corporations provide and “submit wildfire 
mitigation plans” to the CPUC.54 The plans should be comprehensive and 
combine metrics from past fires as well as current guidelines from the CPUC.55 
Once the CPUC approves the plan, the electrical corporation must comply with 
its plan, objectives, and the CPUC’s timeline for such goals.56 
SB 901 drastically changed the post–wildfire cost allocation process.57 The 
CPUC now considers the financial status of a corporation in order to avoid 
harming ratepayers or impacting its service when determining the maximum 
amount it should pay.58 The law created a “stress-test”: how far can the CPUC 
push an electrical corporation without risking service interpretations or 
negatively impacting ratepayers.59 
Both SB 901 and AB 57 had a common theme: preparedness and 
thoughtfulness benefit all parties and create a more stable and reliable service 
provider.60 SB 901 specifically paved the avenue for further legislative action to 
 
49.  Id. 
50.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 11. 
51.  Alexei Koseff, Your Utility Bill Could Reflect Fire Costs Under New California Law, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 21, 2018, 11:59 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/article218803990.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
52.  Judy Lin & Laurel Rosenhall, Jerry Brown Signed $1 billion in Wildfire Prevention-and None of it 
Applies to the Fires This Year, CALMATTERS (Nov. 14, 2018), https://calmatters.org/articles/california-wildfire-
prevention-bill-issues/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).   
53.  Ben Adler, What The Heck is in California’s Wildfire Liability Law that Lawmakers are Voting On 
Friday Night?, CAPITAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/08/31/what-the-
heck-is-in-californias-wildfire-liability-rule-that-lawmakers-are-voting-on-friday-night/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).   
54.  Southern California Edison Company, supra note 45, at 13. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Southern California Edison Company, supra note 45, at 13; Utility Wildfire Mitigation Plans (SB 
901), CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMM’N (May 30, 2019), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/sb901/ (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
57.  SB 901 – Conference Committee Report Bill Summary, CALIFORNIA STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES 
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/sb_901_bill_summary_csac_8-31-
18.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Southern California Edison Company, supra note 45, at 13. 
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create a more comprehensive framework to protect such a vital industry.61 
III. CHAPTER 79 
Chapter 79 aims to mitigate the economic impact that catastrophic wildfires 
have on both California residents and society as a whole.62 It accomplishes this 
by implementing strict safety procedures to help the impacted electrical utility 
companies recover from the debilitating recovery costs.63 Chapter 79 follows SB 
901’s path and takes greater steps to establish a more regimented process for cost 
recovery and future safety implementation.64 Assembly Member Chris Holden 
described how Chapter 79 “will pave the way for very important changes in how 
we address wildfires in California.”65 The law “provides certainty for the markets 
to protect the utilities and provides certainty for fire victims.”66 
Chapter 79’s goal is to establish a regulatory foundation that would shield 
electrical utilities from potentially crippling liabilities without harming 
ratepayers.67 Chapter 79 gives utilities strict requirements to avoid burdening 
customers with resolving cost issues and implementing future safety 
enhancements.68 
The crux of Chapter 79 is a wildfire fund, which will provide faster recovery 
to victims by paying eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire.69  The 
wildfire fund’s main idea is to reduce ratepayer costs while still providing the 
necessary capital for electrical corporations to pay of liabilities.70 The fund 
supports the credit worthiness of the corporations by attracting capital for 
investment in safe and reliable power.71 
To access the fund, an electrical corporation must earn an annual safety 
certification from the CPUC before the approaching wildfire season.72 A 
corporation must tie executive compensation to its safety performance.73 This 
 
61.  SB 901 – Conference Committee Report Bill Summary, supra note 57. 
62.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79). 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Taryn Luna, Utility Customers Will Pay $10.5 billion for California Wildfire Costs Under Bill Sent to 
Newsom, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-wildfire-fund-gavin-newsom-
20190711-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
66.  Id. 
67.  J.D. Morris, California lawmakers move to implement Newsom’s utility wildfire plan, S.F. 
CHRONICLE (June 28, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/California-lawmakers-propose-
legislation-to-14058832.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
68.  Id. 
69.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 8. 
70.  Id. at 2.  
71.  Id. at 2, 12. 
72.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Util. and Energy, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess., 5, 
(Cal. 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
73.  Id. 
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safety certification could include enacting safety committees on its boards of 
directors to help a company’s ability to implement a wildfire mitigation plan.74 
Further, a corporation must invest $5 billion into safety plans and cannot profit 
from this investment.75 Under previous law, state regulators would grant a return 
on the investment.76 
Initially the state’s Surplus Money Investment Fund will provide money for 
the wildfire fund through a loan.77 After this initial funding, electrical 
corporations themselves will contribute to the fund annually through a 
combination of ratepayer contribution and shareholder investment.78 The law 
supplements funding with $10.5 billion in ratepayer expenses through a 
mandatory $2.50 additional monthly charge.79 
An electrical corporation must make an initial investment-which varies with 
the size of the corporation-on top of its annual contribution to access the fund.80 
After a  large electrical corporation makes an initial contribution of $7.5 billion, 
it then makes annual contributions of $300 million.81 A regional electrical 
corporation makes an initial contribution of $625 multiplied by the number of 
accounts it services, the company then makes annual contributions of $25 
measured by the same metric.82 The courts must approve PG&E’s participation.83 
In order to participate, the company must exit its bankruptcy process by June 30, 
2020 without raising rates to customers.84 
Chapter 79 requires the CPUC to determine whether an electrical 
corporation’s ignition-related conduct should allow cost recovery for wildfire 
 
74.  Id. 
75.  The Times Editorial Board, California is Inexplicably Racing to Pass a Badly Vetted Wildfire Bill, 
L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2019, 3:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-wildfire-fund-rush-
20190710-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
76.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 1. 
77.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see generally State of California Manual of 
State Funds, DEP’T OF FINANCE (revised Aug. 2012), 
http://dof.ca.gov/budget/Manual_State_Funds/Find_a_Fund/documents/0681.pdf (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the Surplus Money Investment Fund is “[m]oneys of various funds on 
deposit in the State Treasury are transferred for investment purposes”).  
78.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79). 
79.  Luna, supra note 65; see generally Bryan Anderson, Will Utility Rates Go Up? What California’s 
$26 Billion Wildfire Plan Means for You, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article232603792.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“When California experienced an energy crisis in 2001, the state 
imposed a $2.50-a-month charge on customers of investor-owned utilities. That fee was set to expire next year. 
But under the new law Newsom signed, it will be extended another 15 years”).  
80.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79). 
81.  See id. (“‘Large electrical corporation’ means an electrical corporation with 250,000 or more 
customer accounts within the state”).  
82.  See id. (“‘Regional electrical corporation’ means an electrical corporation with less than 250,000 
customer accounts within the state’”). 
83.  CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRES, CLIMATE CHANGES AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 13, at 9. 
84.  Luna, supra note 65. 
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damage liabilities.85 Ultimately, reasonable conduct predicates cost recovery for 
electrical corporations.86 The conduct was reasonable if it was consistent with 
actions a reasonable utility would undertake in good faith in the same or similar 
circumstances.87 An electrical corporation must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that its conduct was reasonable in order to recover costs.88 The 
corporation automatically satisfies the reasonableness requirement if it had a 
valid safety certification during the wildfire.89 
A party to the action can rebut the presumption of reasonable conduct by 
creating a serious doubt as to the reasonableness of a corporation’s actions.90 The 
burden then shifts back to the corporation to ultimately prove its conduct was 
reasonable.91 If a corporation did behave unreasonably, then it would have to 
reimburse the fund through a predetermined amount based on its operating size.92 
Chapter 79 changes the standards of evaluating electrical utility to encourage 
better fire mitigation practices while simultaneously providing the necessary 
capital these companies need to move forward.93 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Governor Newsom noted in his Strike Force report on California’s wildfire 
status that “[w]ildfires are not only more frequent but far more devastating.”94 
Without action to address this changing status quo, the state faces another energy 
crisis.95 However, Chapter 79 simply buys the Legislature time to come up with 
more sustainable, long-term solutions to combat deadly wildfires.96 Section A 
looks into the causes of wildfires.97 Section B analyzes the costs associated with 
utility-ignited wildfires.98 Section C explores future practices utility companies 
 
85.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Util. and Energy, supra note 72, at 1. 
86.  Id. at 1–2. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. at 2.  
89.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 12. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 12; see Luna, supra note 65 
(explaining how the law limits a company’s risk exposure through a 20% cap on payment).  
93.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79); Luna, supra note 65. 
94.  Wildfires and Climate Change: California’s Energy Future, Governor Newsom’s Strike Force (Apr. 
12, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Wildfires-and-Climate-Change-
California%E2%80%99s-Energy-Future.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
95.  GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, Final Report of the Commission on 
Catastrophic Wildfire Cost and Recovery (2019), available at http://opr.ca.gov/docs/20190618-
Commission_on_Catastrophic_Wildfire_Report_FINAL_for_transmittal.pdf 
 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
96.  Id. 
97.  See infra Part IV.A.  
98.  See infra Part IV.B.  
2020 / The Aftermath of Devastating Wildfires for Utility Customers 
418 
can take to mitigate wildfire risk.99 
A. What Causes Wildfires? 
On average, more than 70,000 wildfires burn about 7,000,000 acres of land 
in the United States each year.100 In 2019 alone 1,349 wildfires burned around 
12,000 acres of land in the Golden State.101 Multiple factors contribute to the 
unusual amount of fires California sees.102 Forest mismanagement is one of the 
factors, as California does not clear enough of the brush that builds up year after 
year.103 Tough winter weather knocks down trees, leading to brush overgrowth 
that dries out over summer and becomes excellent kindling.104 “Wind, humidity, 
and vegetation” primarily drive fire behavior.105 
Although environmental factors set the stage, humans cause a majority of 
California’s wildfires-from “an arsonist lighting up a hillside” to a truck releasing 
a spark.106 Utility-ignited wildfires do not account for all human-ignited 
wildfires, but electrical infrastructure plays a vital role in California’s wildfire 
threat.107 While electrical power only sparks about 9.4% of wildfires, this is 
something utility companies could avoid altogether.108 In three and a half years, 
equipment of California’s three largest utilities ignited more than 2,000 wildfires 
within the state.109 Additionally, PG&E admitted that one of its transmission lines 
 
99.  See infra Part IV.C.  
100.  Claire Wolters, Climate 101: Wildfire, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/natural-disasters/wildfires/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review).  
101.  Jasmine Aguilera, During Record-Breaking Heat Wave, California Sees Nearly 240 Wildfires 
Within a Week, TIME (June 13, 2019), https://time.com/5604644/california-wildfires-heat-wave/ (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
102.  See Kendra Pierre-Louis, Why Does California Have So Many Wildfires?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
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sparked the Camp Fire.110 These same lines were incredibly old, further 
increasing the wildfire risk.111 Old electrical infrastructure in these areas plays a 
major role in sparking these fires.112 
A recent report showed that PG&E delayed work on its lines that were in the 
worst shape to focus on other problems-despite knowing the risk.113 Specifically, 
the company knew the Caribou-Palermo line, which caused the Camp Fire, 
needed work-but the company delayed safety inspections for more than five 
years.114 Despite age and structural integrity concerns, PG&E never performed 
any maintenance.115 This lack of action came to fruition in Paradise.116 
Wind and heat aside, the real cause of California’s worst electrical utility-
ignited wildfires is a lack of oversight.117 In 2010, PG&E hired Quanta 
Technology to assess the age and condition of its transmission structures.118 
While the firm found 90% of the towers were over 60 years old and the company 
should do routine checks on them, PG&E did nothing.119 PG&E showed that 
California cannot rely on electrical utility companies to stop wildfires on their 
own without government intervention.120 
Just because something is old does not mean it needs fixing.121 However, it 
does mean that it needs surveillance and routine maintenance.122 Chapter 79 
attempts to solve this by allowing cost recovery through reasonable actions, 
which would certainly include maintenance and inspections.123 Yet, Chapter 79 
offers nothing more than a promise to Californians that electrical utilities will 
change.124 Lawmakers can only hope corporations buy-in and adhere to the 
provisions laid out in Chapter 79 until California creates more serious plans 
moving forward.125 In the meantime, Californians will be holding their breath as 
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the state enters another fire season.126 
B. Who Actually Pays for Wildfires? 
In addition to the physical destruction and emotional toll, wildfires carry 
overwhelming financial costs.127 The government, citizens, firefighters, and local 
business owners all bear these costs.128 Chapter 79 poses as a consumer 
protection law, even though it focuses on electrical utilities’ costs after a fire.129 It 
promises future reform in exchange for money now.130 Money, however, can 
only come from so many places.131 While Chapter 79 promises that market 
stability now will increase investment and reduce costs for ratepayers, there is no 
guarantee this plan will work.132 
Chapter 79 originated from the fear that Wall Street would turn its back on 
the electrical utility companies after massive liabilities bankrupted them.133 Many 
ratings agencies threatened to downgrade the companies’ credit ratings to junk 
bond status if the Legislature did nothing.134 Lower credit rating means less 
investment, which in turn means ratepayers alone front the utilities’ operating 
and maintenance costs.135 
Chapter 79 is a band-aid that provides necessary capital right now to prevent 
against a  potential future collapse.136 The new law keeps utility companies 
solvent to keep Californians’ lights on.137 Protecting ratepayers and the electrical 
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utilities is ideal, but both parties likely cannot win simultaneously.138 This 
unprecedented new law “speaks to the immense financial threat” that electrical 
companies face in the wake of these fires.139 
PG&E faces roughly $30 billion in liabilities from the last two fire 
seasons.140 Its liability insurance protected the company up to only $1.4 billion 
beginning August 1, 2018.141 While the utility listed $71.4 billion in assets and 
nearly $51.7 billion in debts, the company’s liabilities could eventually exceed its 
market value, which continues to decline.142 Potentially, PG&E could become 
insolvent paying off its liabilities.143 That is where Chapter 79 steps in.144 
The wildfire fund provides immediate capital to pay off PG&E’s liabilities 
and keep the electrical utility afloat.145 If a utility follows the safety plans and 
acts reasonably, it can tap into the fund if its infrastructure sparks a fire.146 If a 
utility fails to act reasonably, it will pay off its liabilities without aid from the 
fund.147 However, someone still has to pay for these liabilities.148 Shifting 
liability simply transfers costs to another party.149 It does not eliminate them.150 
Unfortunately, it seems ratepayers will pay for wildfires either way.151 If the 
utility acts reasonably, ratepayers pay for just and reasonable costs.152 Otherwise, 
ratepayers still contribute to the fund via the $2.50 standard charge on their 
monthly bills.153 Chapter 79 ultimately requires ratepayers to pay more now in an 
effort to pay less later.154 Regardless of when someone must pay, ratepayers and 
wildfire victims still pay for utility-ignited wildfires despite ratepayers’ lack of 
involvement in causing responsibility for the fire.155 
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Chapter 79 is the “least-worst option for utility customers.”156 Ideally, the 
fund shifts the burden of wildfire liabilities from ratepayers to shareholders so 
ratepayers are not alone paying for liabilities through potentially crippling rate 
increases.157 Preemptively addressing the issue of financial viability saves 
ratepayers from providing even more money if a utility company’s credit ratings 
tumble.158 However, just because utilities do not pay the liabilities does not mean 
that they magically go away.159 
Unfortunately, lawmakers need time to work on long-term solutions in order 
to find meaningful changes.160 But time means money and that money has to 
come from somewhere.161 Steven Weissman, a lecturer at UC Berkeley, noted 
that “[d]ollars have to come from somewhere. It’s either ratepayers, taxpayers, 
shareholders or victims. As these wildfires might pile up, you’re going to reach a 
point . . . where either ratepayers can’t pay their bills, shareholders won’t buy the 
stock and on down the line . . . What a bill like this does is buys a little time.”162 
Buying time will only work if lawmakers and electrical utilities use that time 
wisely.163 If customers pay for anything, they should pay for actual 
improvements, not a promise for improvements.164 
C. Potential Solutions 
California’s changing landscape calls for a new approach to how the state 
handles wildfires.165 Chapter 79 provides a financial buffer for utilities and 
lawmakers while they find more permanent fire mitigation solutions.166 Long-
term solutions require time, but these solutions should actually prevent wildfires 
from happening if anything is going to change.167 Subsection 1 talks about how 
utility companies can update their current practices.168 Subsection 2 explores the 
process of undergrounding power lines to mitigate fire risk.169 Subsection 3 
examines employing Public Safety Power Shutoffs as a long-term solution.170 
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1. Updating Current Mitigation Practices 
In response to newly-mandated wildfire mitigation plans, utilities should 
look for alternatives to comply with safety regulations and decrease wildfire 
risk.171 Updating current infrastructure should be the first option a utility 
proposes in its mitigation plans.172 
After the recent increase in deadly wildfires, Southern California Edison 
plans to replace roughly 3,500 miles of overhead power lines with new, insulated 
wires to reduce spark risk.173 Since the Camp Fire, PG&E upgraded its current 
mitigation practices by implementing new technology and conducting more 
intensive review of its existing infrastructure.174 PG&E plans to trim and or 
remove roughly 375,000 trees around its distribution lines in 2019.175 Conducting 
more extensive inspections of the distribution poles and transmission structures 
would provide additional sources of security for PG&E, especially with its older 
lines.176 The utility plans to replace bare overhead wires with covered conductors 
and replace existing equipment with certified low-fire-risk equipment.177 PG&E 
plans on taking even further proactive steps by upgrading transformers to operate 
with more fire-resistant fluids, and install more fire-resistant poles.178 
A utility company’s practices of investigating its own infrastructure needs 
changing too.179 Technological advancements, like real-time weather monitoring 
and aerial drone patrols could give more accurate and current information on 
weather and vegetation conditions.180 While the total cost of these measures is 
unknown, technology can prevent fires by identifying risks and trends in greater, 
more geographically localized detail.181 
Working with existing infrastructure and updating the current system is 
likely the best option for immediate relief.182 Implementing “proper vegetation 
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management practices, replacing wooden poles with steel, concrete, or composite 
ones, or reinforcing utility poles with guy wires” could be just as effective as 
other methods.183 Unfortunately, for a company like PG&E, this is a much larger 
task than it seems.184 
PG&E has over 100,000 circuit miles of electric distribution lines and 
roughly 18,500 circuit miles of interconnected transmission lines.185 Updating 
these lines would take immense amounts of man power, money, and time.186 
PG&E noted that performing routine inspections and cutting back on vegetation 
could cost $75 billion.187 After all the upgrading, when does it become infeasible 
for a utility to keep fixing a broken system of older power lines rather than 
finding better permanent replacement?188 
2. Undergrounding Power Lines 
A popular and common alternative to using overhead wires is putting them  
underground.189 Undergrounding is the process of placing electric infrastructure 
underground in trenches.190 Burying lines can drastically reduce exposure to 
weather conditions that cause fires while increasing reliability during these fire-
causing conditions.191 Nationally, roughly 25% of newly installed distribution 
and transmission lines are underground.192 
Undergrounding seems like an obvious solution, yet it is the most 
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complicated and expensive option.193 A PG&E spokesperson noted that 
“[u]ndergrounding power lines is not a silver bullet that solves all of these 
problems.”194 On average, burying lines costs about ten times more than stringing 
them overhead.195 Undergrounding lines costs roughly $1 million per mile, 
depending on geography and population density.196 And, due to California’s 
population distribution between densely populated cities and rural areas, serving 
the entire state would likely take significantly more cable.197 
North Carolina explored undergrounding its power lines after devastating ice 
storms ravaged the state in 2002.198 The project never began because the state 
projected it “would take 25 years to complete and increase electricity rates by 
125%.”199 Most states that explore this alternative ultimately reject 
undergrounding because of the prejudicial financial impact it has on 
customers.200 
Undergrounding power lines complicates a utility’s ability to detect problems 
with the line.201 “When power lines are underground, it’s more difficult to locate 
the source of the outage. It takes more time to repair.”202 Underground power 
lines are less accessible, which prolongs the duration of outages.203 Even if 
utilities do bury their lines, underground lines are still susceptible to weather 
exposure as overhead feeders control most of the underground systems.204 
While undergrounding power lines mitigates risk from debris and weather 
exposure, it does not completely eliminate that risk.205 Burying lines can make 
them more prone to damage from other severe types of weather, but common fire 
areas might not experience such conditions.206 High flood or moisture areas 
would likely need retrofitted lines to handle such conditions.207 
The massive expense of undergrounding is a real concern for companies 
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already facing insolvency.208 Given the cost of converting existing overhead lines 
to underground, it might not be possible to completely bury an entire power 
system.209 Utilities and the CPUC should explore burying lines in high-fire risk 
areas.210 
Each utility should compare the cost of undergrounding with the cost to 
participate in Chapter 79’s wildfire fund when determining alternatives moving 
forward.211 By comparison, San Diego Gas & Electric (“SDG&E”) will pay its 
4.3% share, roughly $450 million, to join the fund.212 Southern California Edison 
agreed to pay an initial $2.4 billion to join the fund, as did PG&E, which will pay 
roughly $4.8 billion to opt into the fund.213 These investments are substantial, but 
a company should consider this cost to the cost of partially or entirely 
undergrounding its system when searching for alternatives moving forward.214 
3. Public Safety Power Shutoffs 
Utility companies shut off power during high-risk fire weather conditions via 
Public Safety Power Shutoffs (“PSPS”).215 Shutting off power is a quick and 
controllable solution to imminent fire danger.216 Earlier in the year, PG&E cut 
power to 21,000 residents for two days because of high-risk fire conditions.217 
Since 2013, SDG&E conducted thirteen PSPSs and has not had a major fire in 
those present years.218 The key to PSPSs is to have people on the ground who 
monitor the lines.219 SDG&E also has an in-house meteorology team observing 
temperature, humidity, and wind speed at its stations across the state.220 These 
safety measures are intensive and inconvenient but, when done correctly, can be 
successful.221 
While shutting off the power is the quickest, most immediate response to 
high-risk fire weather conditions, it is a last resort for utilities.222 A SDG&E 
spokesperson pointed out that “even after the wind dies down you can’t just turn 
the power back on right away.”223 Shutting off power to large areas poses great 
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dangers of its own.224 PSPS’s curb fire risk by cutting off power to critical 
infrastructure.225 However, medical facilities, museums, grocery stores, and 
schools are some examples of community resources that could not operate 
without any power.226 
This proactive approach might solve immediate problems but is not enough 
on its own solve the wildfire crisis.227 There are major dangers associated with 
cutting off power to a society that requires access to electricity.228 This temporary 
solution is not preferable or even reliable, because California should be looking 
for long-term fire risk mitigation.229 
V. CONCLUSION 
The wildfires in 2017 and 2018 killed 139 people, destroyed communities, 
and changed the lives of tens of thousands of Californians.230 “Those people are 
gone and it can’t be replaced and that’s the sad part right there . . . they’ve lost 
everything.”231 Wildfires will still exist, but that does not mean the Legislature 
should not continue to act to prevent future wildfires.232 While utility companies 
can create safer and more reliable power distribution systems, one solution is not 
enough to permanently stop wildfires.233 Nevertheless, there is a problem when 
the system that  powers communities across California is the same system that 
simultaneously destroys them.234 Fires will never stop, but the government and 
businesses can take steps to prevent them.235 
There is no question the Legislature had to act or risk facing another serious 
energy crisis.236 In theory, Chapter 79 appears effective: help ratepayers by 
allowing quick victim recovery while simultaneously incentivizing greater safety 
measures.237 In reality, the bill just provides a cushion for the Legislature and 
electrical utilities to create better measures and practices for mitigating fire risk 
moving forward.238 There is no way to know whether the 2017 and 2018 
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wildfires were outliers or the new normal.239 Californians would hope though that 
such a buffer would allow time for a utility to implement meaningful change.240 
 
239.  Id. 
240.  Id. 
